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Evolutionary Psychology: A Critique*
David J. Buller

What Is Evolutionary Psychology?
Some researchers define “evolutionary psychology” as simply “the evolutionary study of mind
and behavior” (Caporael 2001, p. 608). So conceived, evolutionary psychology is a field of
inquiry, defined not by any specific theories about human psychology, but only by a
commitment to developing such theories within the framework of evolutionary biology. Other
researchers claim that an evolutionary perspective on human behavior and mentality entails a
number of specific doctrines regarding the nature and evolution of the human mind (Buss 1995;
Cosmides & Tooby 1997; Pinker 1997; Symons 1992; Tooby & Cosmides 1992). For these
researchers, evolutionary psychology is a paradigm, a tightly interwoven web of theoretical
claims, methodological commitments, and empirical results. This paradigm, which I will call
“Evolutionary Psychology” (capitalized) to distinguish it from the field of inquiry
(“evolutionary psychology”), is the focus of this chapter.
The basic tenet of Evolutionary Psychology is that, just as evolution by natural selection
has created human morphological adaptations, so it has created human psychological
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adaptations. Our psychological adaptations, however, are presumably complex traits, and the
construction of complex adaptations typically requires hundreds of thousands of years of
cumulative selection. Our ancestors spent the Pleistocene—the epoch spanning 1.8 million to
10,000 years ago—living in small hunter-gatherer groups, but only the past 10,000 years living
as agriculturists and the past few hundred years living in industrial societies. Consequently,
Evolutionary Psychologists argue, “it is improbable that our species evolved complex
adaptations even to agriculture, let alone to postindustrial society” (Cosmides et al. 1992, p. 5).
Rather, our psychological adaptations must have been designed during the Pleistocene to solve
the adaptive problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. As Cosmides and Tooby say,
“our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind” (1997, p. 85).
Adaptive problems are problems whose solutions enhance the ability to survive or
reproduce. And the adaptive problems faced by our Pleistocene ancestors ranged from
avoiding predators and inedible flora to acquiring mates and forming social alliances. Since
these problems required very different behavioral solutions, Evolutionary Psychologists argue,
a successful solution to one problem could not have transferred to another. So each adaptive
problem would have selected for its own dedicated psychological mechanism. As Symons
argues, “it is no more probable that some sort of general-purpose brain/mind mechanism could
solve all the behavioral problems an organism faces (find food, choose a mate, select a habitat,
etc.) than it is that some sort of general-purpose organ could perform all physiological functions
(pump blood, digest food, nourish an embryo, etc.)” (1992, p. 142). Thus, Evolutionary
Psychologists conclude, the human mind must be “organized into modules or mental organs,
each with a specialized design that makes it an expert in one arena of interaction with the
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world. The modules’ basic logic is specified by our genetic program. Their operation was
shaped by natural selection to solve the problems of the hunting and gathering life led by our
ancestors in most of our evolutionary history” (Pinker 1997, p. 21; emphasis added). Given the
enormous number of adaptive problems our Pleistocene ancestors faced, Tooby and Cosmides
estimate that the human mind consists of “hundreds or thousands” of such evolved modules
(2000, p. 1171).
Modules have the following properties (Buss 1995; Cosmides & Tooby 1997; Tooby &
Cosmides 1992). First, they are domain specific—that is, each module is dedicated to solving one
problem or a restricted range of closely related problems. As such, their information-processing
procedures are activated by, and are sensitive to, only information about a particular aspect of
the world, in much the way that the ear is responsive only to specific vibratory frequencies.
Second, each module comes equipped with substantial innate knowledge about its proprietary
problem domain and a set of innate procedures for employing that knowledge to solve
problems in its proprietary domain. Third, modules develop reliably and without formal
instruction in every “normal” member of the species.
Since “selection usually tends to make complex adaptations universal” (Tooby &
Cosmides 1992, p. 38), Evolutionary Psychologists argue that the network of evolved modules
in the human mind are “the brain/mind mechanisms that collectively constitute human nature”
(Symons 1992, p. 144). This universal human nature can, however, produce individual and
cultural differences when modules encounter different developmental and occurrent inputs. As
Tooby and Cosmides say, an Evolutionary Psychologist “observes variable manifest
psychologies or behaviors between individuals and across cultures and views them as the
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product of a common, underlying evolved psychology operating under different
circumstances” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, p. 45). This entails that “individual differences,
including heritable individual differences, are unlikely to represent differences in the presence
or absence of complex adaptive mechanisms” (Buss 1995, p. 11).
To summarize, the fundamental theoretical tenets of Evolutionary Psychology are these.
First, the human mind consists of “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules,
or special-purpose computational devices, each of which is an adaptation for solving a specific
adaptive problem. Second, the information-processing functions of modules are designed to
solve the problems of survival and reproduction that were faced by our Pleistocene huntergatherer ancestors. And, third, evolved modules collectively constitute a universal human
nature. In the sections to follow, I will argue that each of these tenets is mistaken. (See Buller
(2005) for a comprehensive and detailed critique of Evolutionary Psychology.)

Modularity and the Adapted Mind
The principal argument for the claim that the mind consists of “hundreds or thousands” of
“genetically specified” modules is this. First, our ancestors encountered a diverse array of
adaptive problems, and each adaptive problem “domain” required its own “domain-specific”
solution. Second, no single “domain-general” psychological mechanism could have
successfully solved widely different adaptive problems. Therefore, a distinct psychological
mechanism evolved for each distinct adaptive problem our ancestors faced.
The crucial step in this argument is clearly the second premise—the claim that no single
“domain-general” mechanism could have generated solutions to multiple and varied adaptive
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problems. Cosmides and Tooby support this premise with the following argument: “A woman
who used the same taste preference mechanisms in choosing a mate that she used to choose
nutritious foods would choose a very strange mate indeed, and such a design would rapidly
select itself out” (1994, p. 90). But this argument conflates behavioral solutions to problems
(choosing a high-quality mate and choosing a nutritious food item) with the psychological
mechanisms that produce behavior. And there is no reason to think that the same psychological
mechanism couldn’t produce diverse behaviors that solved distinct problems, in much the way
that the same computer program can produce both spreadsheets and bar charts.
To illustrate this point, consider the domain-general “mechanism” of social learning,
which involves observation of role models followed by imitation of the observed behavior of
those models. Suppose a female employs social learning in figuring out how to select nutritious
peaches: She observes her parents selecting plump and juicy peaches, and she does the same. If
she now switches problem domains to the selection of a mate, the mechanism of social learning
would clearly not guide her to search for a plump and juicy mate. Rather, it would guide her to
observe and imitate the mate-selection behavior of female role models, and this would lead to
the acquisition of mate-selection criteria that are specific to the problem domain of selecting a
mate. So the domain-general mechanism of social learning would generate behavioral solutions
specific to each problem domain in which it operated.
The point of this example is not to defend social-learning accounts of behavior, but to
illustrate that domain-general learning mechanisms could operate on domain-specific inputs,
and make use of information specific to those inputs, in order to generate domain-specific
behavioral solutions to the problems they encounter. So the need for highly specific behavioral
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solutions to adaptive problems in our evolutionary history wouldn’t necessarily have selected
for distinct mechanisms. Thus, the principal argument for modularity rests on a false premise.
Although our species doesn’t appear to have solved the adaptive problems it faced by
evolving a massively modularized brain, it also doesn’t appear to have solved those problems
by evolving a brain consisting of just a few domain-general learning mechanisms (such as social
learning). Indeed, the evidence indicates that the evolution of human intelligence was more
complicated than either of these simple alternatives. For environmental complexity of the sort
posed by the multiple and varied adaptive problems faced by our ancestors typically selects for
phenotypic plasticity (Godfrey-Smith 1998; Sterelny 2003). Phenotypic plasticity is the capacity of
a single genotype to produce more than one adaptive phenotype—more than one anatomical
form, physiological state, or psychological mechanism—in response to environmental
conditions. And research in developmental neurobiology has shown that mechanisms of neural
development embody a plasticity that produces, through interaction with the local
environment, brain structures that perform relatively specialized cognitive functions (Buller &
Hardcastle 2000).
According to our best evidence to date, the brain structures that perform specialized
cognitive functions—and that would have been involved in generating cognitive solutions to
adaptive problems throughout our species’ evolutionary history—develop through a process of
diffuse proliferation of brain cells and connections followed by a “pruning” that shapes this
diffuse connectivity into relatively specialized structures. That is, functionally specialized brain
structures are produced by a process consisting of both “additive” events (the formation and
migration of brain cells and the formation of neural connections) and “subtractive” events (the
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pruning of synapses through cell death and axonal retraction) (Elman et al. 1996). In this
process, gene-directed protein synthesis is involved in the additive events that build the diffuse
connectivity with which brain development begins. The subtractive events, however, are not
under genetic control. Rather, the subtractive events occur through cell competition, whereby
cells with the strongest patterns of innervation (primarily from sensory inputs) retain their
connections and the others die. Thus, genes specify the proteins involved in the additive events
during brain development, but the forms and functions of brain structures are then shaped by
environmental inputs. So the specialized brain structures we have are primarily
environmentally induced, not “genetically specified.”
Our species may, nonetheless, have been faced with recurrent adaptive problems
throughout its evolutionary history, and human brains may have recurrently produced
information-processing solutions to these problems. But contrary to Evolutionary Psychology,
distinct “genetically specified” modules were not required to solve these recurrent adaptive
problems. In designing the human brain, selection hit upon a different solution: a plasticity
that allows particular environmental demands to participate heavily in tailoring the responses
to those very demands. This developmental plasticity, which forms functionally specialized
circuits in response to demands of the local environment, is a domain-general mechanism with
respect to behavioral response. But its function is to produce more highly specialized
mechanisms, which in turn produce behavioral solutions specific to the problem domains that
have been involved in shaping them. This developmental process can produce relatively stable
brain structures that specialize primarily in particular information-processing tasks. But, the
extent to which “modular” outcomes of human brain development have been regular
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throughout some of our evolutionary history is due to the fact that developmentally plastic
human brains have encountered recurrent environmental demands throughout that history, not
to “genetic specification” of the outcomes.
There are two morals to be drawn from this. First, the cognitively specialized brain
structures that are the outcome of brain development have not been shaped by natural
selection. For natural selection does not retain environmentally induced phenotypic
characteristics of organisms; that would be Lamarckian evolution. Instead, natural selection
retains only those genes that have fitness-enhancing effects on an organism’s morphology.
And, as we have seen, genes do not guide the subtractive process that shapes specialized brain
structures. Consequently, the specialized structures in an adult human’s brain are not the
product of hundreds of thousands of years of cumulative selection for incremental, geneticallyinduced modifications to the human brain; they are, instead, the product of that individual’s
history of interaction with the local environment.
Second, it is a mistake to seek adaptation among the products of brain development—
that is, among the relatively special-purpose brain structures that emerge during the course of
brain development. Those products are highly plastic responses to environmental inputs. The
human cognitive adaptation is, instead, the process that generates those special-purpose brain
structures (Deacon 1997). That is, the brain’s plasticity is the adaptation, and the contingently
stable brain structures in an adult’s brain are by-products of that adaptation’s functioning in its
local environment. Similarly, the antibody-assembly process in the immune system is an
adaptation, but the particular antibodies it produces are not. The specific antibodies in an
adult’s immune system (many of which may not have been present in our ancestors) are,
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instead, the result of a plastic system’s interaction with the pathogenic environment. In both
cases, a particular trait (a psychological mechanism or an antibody) is present in an individual
because of how the local environment has acted on a mechanism of plasticity. An adaptation,
however, is a trait that is present in an individual because that individual inherited “genes for”
that trait from ancestors in whom those genes were selected for. Thus, the relatively
“modular,” yet developmentally reversible, structures in an adult brain don’t have the right
etiology to be biological adaptations.
Evolutionary Psychologists frequently support their modular view of the mind by
arguing that the only alternative is the view that “all adult mental organization and content is ...
cultural in derivation and substance” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, p. 115). And they argue
persuasively that this alternative is implausible. But there is a middle ground, which is favored
by the evidence about brain development.
Rather than consisting of a plethora of “genetically specified” modules, the “innate”
structure of the brain consists in a comparatively small number of learning biases, which take the
form of a heightened responsiveness to certain classes of stimuli (Elman et al. 1996; KarmiloffSmith 1992). These learning biases increase the probability that interaction with the
environment will eventually produce domain-specialized structures, but there is no
isomorphism between the “innate” learning biases and the knowledge databases embodied in
the eventually resulting structures. Rather, development proceeds by a process of gradually
branching domain specificity (or problem specialization), and the initial learning biases pertain
only to the first and most general domains in this process (Karmiloff-Smith 1992). For example,
a relatively large chunk of an adult human brain is devoted to face recognition, but infants
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appear to preferentially attend to any stimulus consisting of three high-contrast blobs
configured like the two eyes and the mouth of a face, and they show no preference for actual
faces over blobs. There is a face-recognition learning bias, then, that takes the form of
heightened responsiveness to three high-contrast blobs, but full-blown face recognition is the
result of a gradual process of progressive specialization (Elman et al. 1996, pp. 115-118). There
is no direct mapping from the very minimally specified “innate” learning bias to the complex
knowledge structure embodied in a mature face-recognition “module.” A brain that develops
in this way will mimic one that possesses a plethora of “innate” modules, even though its
“innate” structure is relatively minimal.
According to this alternative picture, human psychological adaptation does not consist
in “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules. Rather, the fundamental
adaptation is the brain’s developmental plasticity, which is capable of producing a wide variety
of problem-specialized information-processing structures that are responsive to local
conditions. Additional adaptations lie in the minimal learning biases instantiated in the early
stages of brain development.

Detecting Cheating in the Evidence for Modularity
But Evolutionary Psychologists have presented empirical evidence, not simply arguments, for
their modular view of the mind. In particular, Cosmides (1989) claims that the modular view of
the mind predicts the existence of a “cheater-detection module,” and she claims to have
gathered strong empirical evidence of this module. If the modular view of the mind has,
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indeed, accurately predicted such a discovery, it has a lot going for it, despite the foregoing
arguments. In fact, however, there is no good evidence of a cheater-detection module.
Precisely why reciprocal altruism—the mutual exchange of fitness benefits—has evolved
in our lineage (and others) remains a much-debated question. But it is widely agreed that, once
individuals evolve altruistic propensities, selection favors the evolution of cheaters, nonreciprocators who accept the fitness benefit of another’s altruistic act without paying the fitness
cost of providing a benefit in return. The evolution of cheaters, in turn, selects for the ability to
detect and avoid cheaters. Accordingly, Cosmides (1989) argues that the human mind should
be innately equipped with a cheater-detection module, a special-purpose psychological adaptation
for detecting cheaters in social exchanges, which evolved to save us the fitness costs of being
exploited.
Evidence for Cosmides’ hypothesis derives from studies with the Wason selection task.
In Wason selection tasks, subjects are given a conditional, if P, then Q, together with four twosided cards displaying information of the form P, not-P, Q, and not-Q, and they are instructed to
turn over those cards necessary to determine whether the conditional is true. The logically
correct solution is to turn over the cards displaying P and not-Q in order to see whether their
other sides contain not-Q and P respectively, since these, and only these, cards can falsify the
conditional. Two results from studies with the Wason selection task are taken as evidence of a
cheater-detection module.
First, there appears to be a content effect in the selection task: The frequency with which
subjects select the “logically correct” cards appears to vary as a function of what the
conditionals are about. For example, when presented with the conditional “If a card has an ‘R’ on
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one side, then it has a ‘2’ on the other side” and cards showing R, J, 2, and 8, an average of only 4
percent of subjects choose the R and 8 cards (the P and not-Q cards), and 79 percent choose
either the R card alone or the R and 2 (P and Q) cards (Evans 1982, pp. 157-159). In contrast,
when presented with the conditional “If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be over 19
years of age” and cards showing drinking beer, drinking Coke, 22 years old, and 16 years old, 73
percent of subjects choose the drinking beer and 16 years old cards (the P and not-Q cards), while
only 20 percent choose drinking beer alone and none choose both drinking beer and 22 years old
(Griggs & Cox 1982). As these examples illustrate, differential performance on Wason selection
tasks is due primarily to an increase in the frequency with which the not-Q card is selected.
Since all conditionals in selection tasks apparently have the same logical form, the
performance differential seems to indicate that subjects are reasoning about the content, not the
logical form, of the conditionals. In particular, since the above drinking-age problem represents
a social exchange, a situation in which an obligation is incurred in order to receive a benefit,
Cosmides (1989) argues that it activates a cheater-detection module, which looks for violations
of the conditional rule (drinking beer while being sixteen years old), whereas the abstract letternumber problem falls on deaf modules, which didn’t evolve to solve abstract non-adaptive
problems. Cosmides supported this analysis by presenting subjects with artificial abstract and
social-exchange problems and finding the same “content effect” biased in favor of improved
performance on the social-exchange problems.
Second, when the logically correct cards differ from those representing cheating, subjects
appear to ignore logic and choose the cards that represent cheating. For example, Cosmides
(1989) gave two groups the following instructions: “You are a member of an island culture in
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which men get facial tattoos upon getting married. The island has a native plant called ‘cassava
root,’ an aphrodisiac that makes men who eat it irresistible to women. Since sex between
unmarried people is taboo on the island, the island’s elders have enacted the following rule….”
She then gave one group a “standard” social-contract conditional “If a man eats cassava root, then
he must have a tattoo on his face” and the other group the “switched” conditional “If a man has a
tattoo on his face, then he eats cassava root.” Both groups were shown the same four cards: eats
cassava root, eats molo nuts, tattoo, and no tattoo. She found that 75 percent of subjects chose eats
cassava root and no tattoo (the P and not-Q cards) in response to the “standard” social-contract
conditional, but that 67 percent chose the same cards in response to the “switched” conditional,
despite their being the logically incorrect not-P and Q cards in that version of the problem.
Thus, Cosmides concluded, subjects don’t apply logical principles in solving selection tasks, but
simply focus on whether someone has accepted a benefit without fulfilling an obligation. And
this, she claims, is evidence of cognitive specialization for detecting cheaters in social exchanges.
But neither result is good evidence of a cheater-detection module. Indeed, both results
are compatible with a non-modular mind that applies domain-general logical principles in
solving Wason selection tasks.
First, there is no genuine content effect in Wason selection tasks. The idea that there is
presupposes that the conditionals in selection tasks have the same logical form and differ only
in their contents (Over 2003). But there are distinct kinds of conditional, each with unique
logical properties (Edgington 1995). In particular, the conditional in the letter-number problem
is an indicative conditional, which makes the truth of one proposition conditional upon the truth
of another, whereas the conditional in the drinking-age problem is a deontic conditional, which
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makes an obligation conditional upon the truth of a proposition. Indeed, all of the problems on
which Cosmides found that subjects do best involved deontic conditionals. And deontic
conditionals actually impose obligations categorically in their Q parts, while indicating on whom
the obligations fall in their P parts (Fodor 2000). Since deontic conditionals actually require Q
(of those of whom P is true), attention is immediately drawn to the not-Q card, and the
frequency with which it’s selected increases accordingly. Thus, differential performance on
Wason selection tasks actually demonstrates a logic effect. Subjects apply different logical
principles to indicative and deontic conditionals (as they would apply different logical
principles to conditionals and conjunctions), and select not-Q with greater frequency in
response to deontic conditionals because the correctness of not-Q is made more perspicuous by
the logic of deontics. Moreover, differential performance on selection tasks is an artifact of
pairing arbitrary indicative conditionals with deontic conditionals. Several studies have found
that, when subjects are given “real-world,” rather than arbitrary, indicatives, the frequency of
logically correct responses equals that for deontics (Cheng & Holyoak 1989; Manktelow & Over
1990; Sperber et al. 1995).
Second, the idea that subjects ignore the logic of conditionals in order to focus on
whether cheating has occurred falsely presupposes that changing the wording of conditionals in
selection tasks changes how subjects mentally represent their logical forms. In Cosmides’
“switched” problem, for example, subjects were presented with a background story that clearly
required a facial tattoo of those eating cassava root, but were then asked to evaluate compliance to
the conditional rule “If a man has a tattoo on his face, then he eats cassava root,” which not only
didn’t make sense in the context of the background story, but didn’t contain the obligating
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word “must,” which was present in the “standard” social-contract version of the problem (cf.
Cosmides 1989, p. 217). Under such circumstances, language-comprehension mechanisms
process the conditional together with the background information and output a mental
representation of the logical form of the conditional that makes sense given the background
information (as we all do, for example, when we represent the logic of the expression “all is not
lost” as “not all is lost”). Thus, subjects didn’t select the “logically incorrect” cards in Cosmides’
“switched” problem; they selected the logically correct cards relative to their representation of
the (deontic) logical form of the conditional. In other words, subjects simply applied logic to a
sensible interpretation of the problem. (Similar arguments apply to results obtained by
Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) and Fiddick et al. (2000).) So “logically incorrect” results in Wason
selection tasks fail to show that subjects don’t reason using general logical rules. There is, then,
no good evidence of a cheater-detection mechanism.

“Our Modern Skulls House a Stone Age Mind”
Evolutionary Psychologists offer the following single argument in support of the claim that
each human psychological adaptation is adapted to Pleistocene conditions. The 10,000 years
since the end of the Pleistocene, they argue, “is only a small stretch in evolutionary terms, less
than 1% of the two million years our ancestors spent as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers. For this
reason, it is unlikely that new complex designs—ones requiring the coordinated assembly of
many novel, functionally integrated features—could evolve in so few generations” (Cosmides et
al. 1992, p. 5). Thus, Evolutionary Psychologists conclude, our psychological adaptations must
be adapted to the Pleistocene conditions under which they evolved.
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This argument, however, commits a couple of simple fallacies. First, the issue is not
whether “new complex designs” that require the “coordinated assembly” of many features
could have emerged in the 10,000 years, or 400 generations, since the Pleistocene. Without
doubt, selection could not build a human mind from scratch in a mere 400 generations. But,
from the fact that a “new complex design” could not have evolved since the Pleistocene, it
doesn’t follow that old complex designs, which evolved during the Pleistocene or even earlier,
could not have been significantly modified by selection in 400 generations. Since the argument
doesn’t address this possibility, it fails to show that the psychological adaptations of
contemporary humans must be identical to those of our Pleistocene ancestors.
Second, the argument assumes that the 1 percent of human evolutionary history since
the Pleistocene is unimportant in comparison to the 99 percent spent as hunter-gatherers. But,
as Wilson says, “it makes no sense to express evolutionary time as a proportion of the species’
history” (1994, p. 226). It doesn’t matter whether a lineage spends only 1 percent of its
evolutionary history in a new environment, Wilson argues; what matters is what kinds of
change occur during that 1 percent of its evolutionary history. Thus, “rather than marvelling at
the antiquity of our species, we should be asking what kinds of evolutionary change can be
expected in 10, 100, or 1000 generations” (p. 226).
There is, in fact, ample evidence that Evolutionary Psychologists greatly underestimate
the evolutionary change that may have occurred since the end of the Pleistocene. In considering
such change, we need to address two questions. First, have the environments inhabited by
human populations since the Pleistocene changed in ways that have altered the selection
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pressures on human psychology? Second, if so, has there been sufficient time for an
evolutionary response to these changes?
The answer to the first question is undoubtedly yes, and this is due largely to
environmental changes produced by human activity. The agricultural and industrial
revolutions, for example, precipitated fundamental changes in the social structures of human
populations, which in turn altered the selection pressures on a variety of interpersonal
behaviors. For example, while Pleistocene humans lived in groups of 50-150 individuals, postagricultural humans have lived in increasingly larger groups, which has affected the challenges
humans face when mating, forming alliances, or negotiating status hierarchies. In addition,
changing social structures have wrought radical changes in the kinds of task that must be
performed to acquire the resources necessary for successful child rearing. Even if huntergatherers had evolved “Darwinian algorithms” to solve the problems involved in acquiring
resources necessary for child rearing in savanna environments, such Darwinian algorithms
would be useless in the world of Wage-Laborer Man, since the tasks leading to acquisition of
food and other resources have changed so drastically. Thus, environmental change since the
Pleistocene has assuredly created strong selection pressure for psychological evolution.
But has there been sufficient time since the Pleistocene for an evolutionary response to
these environmental changes? The question is not whether there has been enough time for
human populations to evolve minds that are adapted to twenty-first-century environments.
The question, instead, is whether there has been enough time for modification of the
psychological adaptations possessed by our Pleistocene ancestors. And there are two reasons
for answering in the affirmative.
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First, there are clear cases of post-Pleistocene adaptive evolution in physiological and
morphological traits. For example, “the persistent domestication of cattle, and the associated
dairying activities, did alter the selective environments of some human populations for
sufficient generations to select for genes that today confer greater adult lactose tolerance”
(Laland et al. 2000, p. 132). The evolution of lactose tolerance was driven by niche construction, a
process in which a population actively modifies the niche it inhabits, thereby modifying the
selection pressures driving its own evolution. Niche construction typically accelerates the pace
of evolution as successive generations of a population continually modify the sources of
selection acting on themselves and subsequent generations. And humans have been supreme
niche constructors. The development of agriculture and industry greatly altered human niches,
and developments in medicine have continually altered the toll of disease on survival and, as a
consequence, opportunities to reproduce. Indeed, niche construction has pervaded nearly
every aspect of human life in recent centuries, ranging from methods of shelter construction to
methods of food preparation and preservation (think of pasteurization, for example), from
methods of contraception to organized education. And there is no reason to think that niche
construction has driven only physiological and morphological evolution. For, on the
psychological side, techniques of teaching, whether skill- or information-based, have altered the
cognitive niche in which humans develop, and the recent development of information
technologies is radically altering the cognitive niche to which future generations will adapt.
Second, the idea that human psychological adaptations cannot have evolved since the
end of the Pleistocene depends on a false assumption about the rate at which selection can alter
traits in a population. Recent work has shown that evolution by natural selection can occur
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very rapidly. Reznick et al. (1997) split populations of guppies living in high-predation
environments, leaving a part of each population in its high-predation environment and moving
the other part to a low-predation environment. They found that life-history traits of the
transplanted guppies evolved significantly in a mere 18 generations. The descendants of the
transplanted guppies matured to a larger size and achieved reproductive viability at a later age
than the non-transplanted guppies, they produced fewer litters (with fewer and larger offspring
in each litter), and they allocated less of their total resources to reproduction during their early
reproductive lives. Moreover, Reznick and his colleagues identified both the genetic basis of
this change and the mechanism by which selection drove it (namely, differential mortality by
predation). If this much evolution can occur in 18 generations, the 400 human generations since
the end of the Pleistocene has certainly been sufficient time for selection-driven evolution in
human psychological traits.
Thus, it is overwhelmingly likely that there has been some adaptive psychological
evolution since the end of the Pleistocene, which has rendered contemporary humans
psychologically different from their Pleistocene ancestors. There is no reason to think that “our
modern skulls house a Stone Age mind.”

“Human Nature”
One of the most obvious things in the world is that people differ in their attitudes, preferences,
and behavioral responses to similar situations. This is true not only of individuals from
different cultures, but of individuals within the same culture. According to Evolutionary
Psychologists, however, “variable manifest psychologies or behaviors between individuals and
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across cultures” are “the product of a common, underlying evolved psychology operating
under different circumstances” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, p. 45). This doctrine relies heavily on
the claim that variation exists only among the outputs of our psychological adaptations as a
function of variation in the inputs to invariant psychological adaptations. Manifest
psychological variation, according to Evolutionary Psychologists, is never a function of
variation in the underlying psychological mechanisms of “normal” human beings. Thus,
according to Evolutionary Psychologists, there are no psychological polymorphisms—that is, there
are no alternative forms of psychological adaptations that are maintained by selection’s acting
on underlying genetic differences between individuals.
There are two arguments offered in support of this view. The first argument is as
follows (see Tooby & Cosmides 1992, pp. 78-79). “Complex adaptations are intricate machines
... that require coordinated gene expression, involving hundreds or thousands of genes to
regulate their development” (p. 78). Since sexual reproduction is a process in which random
halves of each parent’s genes are “recombined” to form the genome of a zygote, if parents
differed in any of their complex adaptations, randomly recombining the genes for those
adaptations would make it highly improbable that offspring would receive all the genes
necessary to build any of the adaptations. Consequently, if individuals differed in their
complex adaptations, no adaptation could be reliably reproduced across generations.
“Therefore, it follows that humans, and other complex, long-lived, outbreeding organisms,
must be very nearly uniform in those genes that underlie our complex adaptations” and that
this genetic uniformity “tends to impose near uniformity at the functional level in complex
adaptive designs” (p. 79). It follows that no psychological differences result from genetic
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polymorphisms maintained by selection, since such polymorphisms would constitute
alternative adaptive designs. Thus, Evolutionary Psychologists conclude, there must be “a
universal and uniform human nature” (p. 79). To the extent that genetic differences influence
psychological differences, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, they can affect only “quantitative
variation” in qualitatively identical adaptations (in the way that genetic variation can affect the
size of one’s stomach, for example, but not whether one has a stomach).
Evolutionary Psychologists do, however, recognize an important exception to the
universality of human nature. Since mating and reproduction pose different problems for the
two sexes, selection has designed certain sex-specific suites of complex adaptations for solving
these problems. With respect to phenomena such as mate choice, then, human nature bifurcates
along the fault line of sex, with each sex possessing its own “nature” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992,
pp. 81-82).
This argument, however, is multiply problematic. First, as Wilson (1994) points out, if
the argument were sound, there would be no genetic polymorphisms in any sexually
reproducing species, but there are many well documented examples of such polymorphisms.
For example, males of the marine isopod crustacean species P. sculpta come in small, medium,
and large, and these sizes perfectly correlate with distinct mating strategies (Shuster & Wade
1991). Large males secure and “guard” harems of females in the recesses of sponges, acquiring
their copulations with the harem members. Small males acquire copulations by “sneaking” past
inattentive large males and thereby gaining access to the females in the harem. Medium males
morphologically resemble females, so they “mimic” the female courtship display and thereby
gain entry to a large male’s harem, where the medium male then copulates with the females
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inside. These three “adaptive designs” have equal reproductive success, and the genes
underlying them have been identified. Yet such a genetic polymorphism constitutes a clear
violation of the assumptions at play in Tooby and Cosmides’ argument. So the argument is
mistaken.
Second, the argument mistakenly assumes that selection acts only on qualitative
variation and that, as long as individuals are “qualitatively identical,” quantitative differences
are selectively irrelevant. But this assumption is false. Indeed, sexual dimorphism, which
Evolutionary Psychologists take to be a “qualitative” difference, is actually the result of very
ancient selection on quantitative differences in gamete size. This form of selection, called
disruptive selection, favored the two extremes of gamete size (favoring large gametes for the
nutrients they could store and small ones for their motility in reaching the larger gametes),
while selecting against medium-sized gametes. So observable quantitative variation may
actually be acted on and maintained by selection; and, when it is, it is a genetic polymorphism.
Third, the argument mistakenly assumes that, since adaptations require hundreds or
thousands of genes for their development, if individuals differ in some adaptation, they must
differ with respect to hundreds or thousands of genes (which the argument purports to show is
impossible). As we have seen, however, Evolutionary Psychologists consider male and female to
be distinct adaptive designs. Yet this adaptive difference is a product of a single gene difference,
the SRY gene on the Y chromosome, which codes for testis-determining factor. Of course, SRY
produces its effects only against a background of hundreds or thousands of genes shared by
males and females; but the differences in adaptations result from a single gene difference against
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that background. As Wilson (1994) argues, there could be many other adaptational differences
in humans that are likewise due to single gene differences.
Consequently, the argument fails to show that selection did not and does not produce
and maintain some psychological polymorphisms in human populations. And this, in turn,
means that the argument fails to show that selection must have created “a universal and
uniform human nature.”
The other argument for a universal human nature I call “the argument from Gray’s
Anatomy.” As Tooby and Cosmides argue, “the fact that any given page out of Gray’s Anatomy
describes in precise anatomical detail individual humans from around the world demonstrates
the pronounced monomorphism present in complex human physiological adaptations.
Although we cannot yet directly ‘see’ psychological adaptations (except as described
neuroanatomically), no less could be true of them” (1992, p. 38). Selection, in other words, has
designed in humans a “universal architecture,” in the sense that “everyone has two eyes, two
hands, the same sets of organs, and so on” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, p. 78). Since selection has
presumably designed our minds as well as our bodies, we should expect selection to have
designed a universal psychological architecture, which constitutes our “universal human
nature.” But there are problems even with this seemingly commonsensical argument.
First, as Wilson points out, “uniformity at the coarsest scale does not imply uniformity at
finer scales” that are still selectively relevant (1994, p. 224). Every human may have a brain
with two hemispheres, a cortex, an occipital lobe, and so on, but this doesn’t imply universality
of more micro-level psychological mechanisms. Since Evolutionary Psychologists claim that
our universal psychological adaptations are modules, which are finer-grained brain structures,
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they need to demonstrate universality at this “finer scale.” But the argument from Gray’s
Anatomy fails to do so.
Second, the “coarsest scale” to which Evolutionary Psychologists retreat in their
argument from Gray’s Anatomy is incommensurate with their definition of human nature as
consisting of “qualities that define us as a unique species” (Buss 1999, p. 47). For the universals
appealed to in this argument (two hands, two eyes, a stomach, skin) characterize the whole
primate order and sometimes the whole class of mammals and even all vertebrates. So the
analogical appeal to this “coarsest scale” of uniformity supports no conclusion about universal
psychological adaptations that purportedly “define us as a unique species.”
Third, the basic structural plan that typifies the “universal architecture” of a species—
and that, at ever coarser scales of description, typifies the body plan of an order, class, and
subphylum—consists primarily of features that have persisted down lineages and through
speciations for tens to hundreds of millions of years. Thus, while selection probably played a
role in designing the structural plan of humans, it didn’t design that structural plan during
human history, but during the history of the common ancestor of humans and other primates or
vertebrates. So we can’t really infer anything about psychological adaptations, which
purportedly resulted from selection during relatively recent human history, from the fact that
all humans (except the “abnormal”) have two eyes, two hands, one nose, and a mouth.
Of course, this doesn’t mean that there are no psychological universals of the sort that
might interest Evolutionary Psychologists. It just means that there are no a priori
considerations definitively showing that there are such universals awaiting discovery by
Evolutionary Psychologists. It also means that, insofar as Evolutionary Psychology takes
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psychological adaptation as its object of inquiry, it must be prepared to investigate
psychological variation just as studiously as any potential psychological universality. In other
words, evolved “human nature” isn’t constituted solely by psychological universals, but is at
least partially constituted by adaptive variation.
This, however, prompts some questions. What if there are psychological universals?
What should we make of them? As we saw earlier, Evolutionary Psychologists are mistaken in
thinking that the totality of human psychological adaptations reflects adaptation to Pleistocene
environments. Selection is undoubtedly continuing to modify trait frequencies in human
populations. That means that any psychological universals we might happen to discover are
temporally bound. They characterize human populations at a given moment in evolutionary
history, and they are subject to change. Today’s universals may be possessed by only a fraction
of the species, or even extinguished, tomorrow. Thus, as Hull (1989) argues, it is a mistake to
think that any universals we might discover reveal to us the “nature” of our species, in any
interesting sense of “nature.”
Moreover, if there are psychological universals, at least some of them will be the result
of genetic drift, rather than selection (since some portion of all fixated traits are due to drift). Of
course, Evolutionary Psychologists argue that drift-fixated traits are not typically incorporated
into the “complex organized design” of the organism (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, p. 52). For this
reason, they don’t take drift-fixated psychological traits to be part of “human nature.” But
nothing in orthodox neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory justifies treating adaptations as
somehow more “central” than drift-fixated traits, as somehow a part of the core “nature” of a
species in a way that drift-fixated traits are not. To privilege adaptations in this way is to adopt
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what Godfrey-Smith (1999) calls a form of natural theology: It is to replace God with Natural
Selection as the Creator, but to still maintain that the Creator’s “intention” (as manifested in
what is selected-for) represents the “nature” of a species, departure from which is “abnormal.”
But this particular way of wielding evolutionary theory is not intrinsic to evolutionary theory; it
is an unjustified addition to it. Consequently, there is no evolutionary justification for the
adaptation-centered concept of “human nature” employed by Evolutionary Psychology.

Conclusion
There can be little doubt that evolution has occurred and that Homo sapiens is among its
products. There can also be little doubt that the evolutionary history of our lineage has left its
mark on human psychology just as assuredly as it has left its mark on human morphology. The
human mind, unquestionably, is the product of evolution. But what follows from this fact? I
have argued not only that none of the central tenets of Evolutionary Psychology follow from this
fact, but that all of the theoretical tenets of this paradigm are either misguided or
unsubstantiated. This does not imply, however, that evolutionary psychology (as a field of
inquiry) is bankrupt. It implies, rather, that Evolutionary Psychology is not the paradigm that
will guide evolutionary psychology toward a more adequate evolutionary understanding of
human psychology.
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